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ABSTRACT 
 
Capital structure has been one of the most controversial issues in the ground of 
finance during past decades. Although there have been a number of existing theories 
and empirical studies observing patterns involved in choosing a capital structure, 
until now, there is no universal one. In this regard, this dissertation attempts to 
explain the capital structures. The capital structures in this case involve the study of 6 
ratios regarding to debt-to-equity, debt-to-assets, and equity-to-assets, or this 
research can be called the study of debt-equity structures. 
 
This study attempts to answer the question concerning the debt-equity structures of 
the pharmaceutical companies listed in the SEC during the period 1998 to 2008. 
With the objective to investigate whether the pharmaceutical firms pursue the target 
debt-equity ratios or not, the report employs the simple regression analysis developed 
from the Partial Adjustment Model. The results from the methodology reveal that is 
the weak evidence support debt-equity ratios of pharmaceutical firms in the sample 
converge to the industry mean. Though, the results give strong support that most 
ILUPV¶ UDWLRV KDYH EHHQ PRYHG WRZDUG WKH WDUJHW UDWLR ,Q WKLV UHJDUG unavoidable 
research limitations are also mentioned for further studies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during past decades has 
been the theory of capital structure. Many business management and academic 
scholars pay attention to this structure because it involves the finding of the right 
financing mix between debt and equity in order to gain tax advantage and to 
PD[LPLVHWKHILUP¶VYDOXH 
 
A great number of researchers have discussed and published the papers in the field of 
capital structure study. For instance, many researchers have been interested in the 
relation between capital structure and stock returns (Welsh, 2004) or some have 
looked at the debt/equity by analyzing the security issues (Baxter and Cragg, 1970) 
and issue timings of debt and equity (Taggart, 1977). Given the large amount of 
research on various aspects of capital structure, however, there are few researches 
have been studied in the specific industry such as pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceuticals 
is the interesting industry because it remains one of the most profitable industries 
with a growing significance.  Because the intensive of its operations impact people as 
a whole, a number of related regulations are demanded in this industry. This reason 
might cause capital structure of firms in the pharmaceutical industry possessed 
different characteristics compared to other industries. However, there have been 
shortage studies in the capital pattern issues and target ratio of capital structure in 
this industry, to understand more about the capital structure of pharmaceutical firms 
is appealing to me to study this topic.   
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1.1 The Purpose of the Dissertation 
 
The aim of this paper is to develop more understanding of the pattern of debt ratios 
of various firms in the pharmaceutical industry.  Particularly, this report intends to 
answer this question: 
³Is there any evidences that pharmaceutical companies will adapt or adjust their 
debt-equity ratios to the target level which in this case is the industry mean?´ 
 
To answer this question, the hypothesis is developed to suggest as a possible 
explanation for this particular condition, this will be explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
The 15 sample companies using to the statistical analysis for this hypothesis is 
random from the big1 pharmaceutical companies listed in The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (commonly known as the SEC) during the period of 1998-
2008. Although the larger sample size may present more concise result, time 
constraints and limitation of data availability are the main factors affecting the 
conduct of this analysis.  However, I believe the sample size using in this dissertation 
can give the general idea about how pharmaceutical firms adjust their capital 
structure toward the industry mean. 
 
This report applies a simple regression model to determine the statistical 
coefficiences and significances of the six ratios including long- term debt-to-total 
assets, total debt-to- total assets, short-term debt-to-equity, long- term debt-to-equity, 
total debt-to-equity, and equity-to-assets However, it can be argued that short term 
                                               
1
 The phrase Big Pharma is often used to refer to companies with revenue in excess of $3 billion,  and/or R&D 
expenditure in excess of 500 million dollars. 
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debt ratio representing the total debt could have been used. The rationale behind 
using six different measures of debt is based on the fact pointed out by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) that leverage ratios might vary depending on the objective of the 
study. The objective of this study is to find out the firm debt-equity structure in that 
ZKHWKHUWKHILUP¶VOHYHUDJHWHQGWRFRQYHUJHWRWKHLQGXVWU\PHDQRYHUWLPH. Hence, 
it seems reasonable that using only the total debt ratio will be insufficient to provide 
confident results since there is possibility that leverage costs of short term debt may 
differ from those of long term debt. (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993) 
 
Finally, although numerous researches have studied on the optimal capital structure 
or determinants of capital structure, the principal aim of this dissertation is not to 
discover those aspects. The objective of this study is to investigate whether 
pharmaceutical companies are pursuing the target capital structure of their industry 
or not. 
 
1.2 The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is organised into six chapters as follows. Next chapter presents the 
background literature of capital structure which includes well known theories such as 
the Modigliani and Miller theory, the pecking order theory as well as tradeoff theory. 
Chapter 3 starts with the prior studies regarding whether and how firms pursued the 
target capital structure and then a review of the literature concerning the capital 
structure behaviour of firms will be demonstrated. Chapter 4 is the research 
methodology which presents the data description, the research model and  the 
methods used in this study. Chapter 5 represents the empirical test results and 
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analytical discussion.  Chapter 6 is the last chapter to draw conclusion, some 
limitations and suggestions also investigated to further studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF THEORIES 
 
This chapter starts with the background literature of capital structure in order to gain 
the general idea about the theory which is the foundation to further research in this 
field and then pharmaceutical economic circumstances that may have triggered the 
changes in capital structure of the industry will be explained. 
 
2.1 Capital Structure Theories 
 
There are many different paths that firms can choose to raise funds in their 
businesses; these methods are all studied as part of Corporate Finance Theory. In the 
past most people chose to focus on the relationship between capital structure and 
income tax payments as well as the specified administrative costs of bankruptcy. 
Capital Structure is the description given to the mix of different securities held by a 
company (Brealey and Myers, 2004). When looking at how to structure capital 
within a company most firms take into consideration that this is primarily a 
marketing issue. There have been many articles and publications over the years 
focusing on what is the ideal business mix for a company and several have been 
proposed though one has stood out as the best answer so far. The optimal structure is 
a varied mix of internal and external finance (debt and/or equity) that optimizes the 
value of a firm. Therefore, the question of how to finance and also from where and 
from whom to gain this finance becomes crucial. The work of Titman and Wessels 
(1988) reveal that firms select capital structures depending on attributes that 
determine various costs and benefits associated with the form of financing used. 
  
14 
 
Many experts understand that there are also a number of other factors which 
GHWHUPLQHDFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH7KLVKDV OHGWRDQXPEHURIRWKHUWKHRULHV
such as irrelevance theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1963),   Static trade-off theory 
(Myers, 1984), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), pecking order theory 
(Brander and Lewis, 1986), product/input interactions as well as theories driven by 
corporate control considerations (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
 
2.1.1 The irrelevance theory of capital structure 
 
Modigliani and Miller started a debate in 1958 when they established a framework to 
UHYLHZDFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH7KH\HVWDEOLVKHG WKH IUDPHZRUNWR VWXG\ WKH
FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH E\ ILQGLQJ DSSDUHQWO\ UHDVRQDEOH FRQGLWLRQV LQ WHUPV RI D ILUP¶V
FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH LUUHOHYDQW WR LWV YDOXH 7KHLU ZRUN WLWOHG µThe cost of capital, 
FRUSRUDWLRQ ILQDQFH DQG WKH WKHRU\ RI LQYHVWPHQW¶ JDYH ULVH WR RQH RI WKH PRVW
important debates in the field of corporate finance literature, which in turn spawned a 
large amount of theoretical and empirical research. 
 
However, Modigliani and Miller (1958) framework could work well under certain 
assumptions. The most basic of these was in presuming perfect capital markets and 
zero transaction costs and tax. They also made further assumptions in their work in 
that individuals and corporations would borrow at a risk free rate, and that 
FRPSDQ\¶V LVVXHG RQO\ WZR W\SHV RI FODLPV ULVN IUHH GHEW DQG ULVN\ HTXLW\ 7KH\
ignored the following items enterprise or individual income tax and made the leap 
that no bankruptcy costs are associated with raising debt. Investors in their theory 
would have the expectation that the payoff and rate of risk would be equal and that 
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all firms would belong to the same risk class.  Also all cash flows would be 
perpetuities with constant growth and assumed a world without information costs and 
agency costs. (Berry, 2006) 
 
The underlying concept of Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions could be 
illustrated through the simple market value balance sheet of a firm. Considering a 
market value balance sheet in Figure 1, the right hand side of the balance sheet that is 
GHEW'DQGHTXLW\(UHIOHFWVWKHYDOXHRIWKHILUPWKDWLV9$FRPSDQ\¶VYDOXH
as stated by Modigliani and Miller (1958) will remain the same and is not dependant 
on the ratio between debt and equity of the company. This will only be in effect 
though as long as the assets and growth opportunities on the left hand side of the 
balance sheet remain constant. Therefore, according to this proposition financial 
leverage that is the amount of debt in the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant. This 
PHDQV WKDW D FRPSDQ\¶V ILQDQFLDO OHYHUDJH UHPDLQV LUUHOHYDQW HYHQ ZKHQ WKH GHEW
maturity is short term, long term or the debt is callable or call protected, straight or 
convertible or in any denomination (Myers, 2001). 
 
Many factors can change the value of a company both positively and negatively, 
when these changes happen they can be seen as opportunities for growth. The first 
type happens when there is a sudden change causing a growth spurt in the company. 
The working capital will also reflect these changes which would increase/decrease 
WKH YDOXH RI WKH ILUP DV ZHOO DV LPSDFWLQJ RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V OLTXLGLW\ UDWLR GHEW
service ratio and fixed assets. Therefore, this proposition of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) could be work when the left hand side of the balance sheet remains constant. 
Their assumption also implies separation between investment and finance decision as 
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it signifies that a firm may use the capital budgeting procedures without worrying 
about where the money for capital expenditure are raised (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 
2006). 
   
Figure 1: A Market-value Balance Sheet (Myers, 2001). 
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) second proposition, the expected rate of 
return on the common stock of a levered firm would increases in proportion to the 
debt (D) to equity (E) ratio (see figure 1 above). The expected rate of return depends 
on the spread between the expected rate of return on a portfolio of all securities and 
the expected return on the debt. This then resolves that the rate of return the 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ UHFHLYHV GHSHQGV RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V GHEW WR HTXLW\ UDWLR %UHDOH\
Myers and Allen, 2006). 
 
The belief that there is no optimal capital structure is one that is proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) they take the view that a firm's financial structure does 
not influence its cost of capital and there are no taxes or bankruptcy costs to be 
equated. In the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, this position has been 
modified to involve an optimal capital structure which prefers less than 100% 
debt.7KH\DOVRVDZWKHFKDQJHVFRPSDQ\¶VPDGHWRWKHLUFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDVDWWHPSWV
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to reduce the amount they were taxed. Corporate taxes would be avoided for interest 
payments but not for dividends. In reviewing this idea we need to assume there are 
no other advantages to equity over debt and as such firms should issue no equity but 
should issue debt with a value equal to the highest possible future value of the 
company. This supposition would mean that in aOO OLNHOLKRRGµDOO-GHEW¶ILUPVZRXOG
almost always default on their debts. 
 
Modigliani and Millers theory was based on very fixed assumptions, which in turn 
meant that the results they produced were highly criticized within the academic field. 
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) opponent argue the theory of Modigliani and 
Millethat market imperfections makes personal borrowing excessively costly and 
risky which creates a natural clientele willing to pay a premium for shares of 
leveraged firms. Opponents of this hypothesis though argue that companies would 
have to borrow even more to realize the premium. Secondly, Brealey, Myers and 
Allen (2006) take the view that according to two influential American economists the 
overall cost of capital of a firm known as weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
does not depend on the capital structure. This idea though does bring into question its 
viability when a company introduces taxes. In respect of (WACC) we can see that 
debt interest is tax-deductible, and WACC is also worked out on the after tax interest 
rate. This gives a prominent tax advantage on debt, causing a company to be more 
open to utilizing larger amounts of debt in its capital structure than would otherwise 
be prudent.  
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2.1.2 Static trade-off theory of capital structure 
 
Modigliani and Millers (1958) irrelevance proposition helped create the theory of 
µWUDGH-RII¶ 7UDGH-off utilizes the proposition of efficient markets with symmetric 
information but goes further by adding a variety of market imperfections. This report 
shall look at this theory in detail below and review the argument that suggests an 
optimal capital structure for each firm, and how this can be achieved by balancing 
the various benefits and costs of debt. The discussion would be started by adding 
taxes to Modigliani and Miller (1958) basic model. 
 
1) The Tax Advantages of Debt Financing 
The tax benefits of debt can be seen to affect financing decisions within companies 
according to Mackie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996 & 2000). The affects of both 
tax and bankruptcy on a company can be seen as one of the main drivers which 
influence how they make their capital structure decisions. Payment of interest on 
debt is usually tax deductible. This theory states that Debt interest shields income 
from taxation and thus profitable firms should use more debt. Michaelas et al (1999) 
made an interesting supposition they stated that tax paying firms would have to use 
debt instead of equity; this would be the case until the company started suffering 
financial distress. 
 
Fama and French (2002) also looked at how companies would identify the optimal 
leverage by weighing up the costs and benefits of a variety of debt structures. Tax 
deductibility can be seen as one of the main benefits of this process, as it would 
allow companies to reduce the problems around ensuring a free flow of cash is 
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maintained. They go on to argue that taxes have two other offsetting effects on 
optimal capital structures of companies. These are the deductibility of interest 
payments which push firms towards a higher target leverage whilst also at the same 
time a higher personal tax rate on debt relative to equity pushes them the opposite 
way. They further argue that with bankruptcy costs rise when profitability declines2. 
These costs propel companies towards lower leverage targets in response to this. 
 
 2) The Existence of Bankruptcy Costs and Financial Distress 
Myers (1977) also tries to close the gap between the suggestion that tax benefits 
should encourage companies to borrow as much as possible and the empirical 
evidence that companies tend to limit their borrowing. He suggests that bankruptcy 
costs, i.e. transaction costs of liquidation and reorganization, discourage borrowing. 
He further states that a company will also incur costs in situations of financial 
distress such as the threat of bankruptcy, even if bankruptcy is then ultimately 
avoided. Modigliani and Miller (1958) actually appear to hint to the possibility of 
bankruptcy costs in their original work, as highlighted by Miller in his later work in 
(1977). Other early research into the costs created by bankruptcy and financial 
distress includes that written by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Bierman and 
Thomas (1972), Baxter (1967), Robichek and Myers (1966) which are worth reading 
to view a variety of arguments specifically around this topic. 
 
There are two qualitative observations about the costs of bankruptcy and financial 
distress in regard to capital structure that Myers (1984) points out. Risky firms 
should borrow less as a greater variance in income (cash flows) results in a greatly 
                                               
2 Bankruptcy costs are higher for firms with more volatile earnings, which should drive smaller, less 
diversified firms towards less leverage. 
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increased chance of them failing to meet the interest payments on their debt which 
could eventually spiral into a situation where they would be unable to meet their 
repayments and end up defaulting on them. Myers conversely looks at less risky 
firms with stable cash flows should borrow more before getting into financial 
distress. The second observation relates to the fact that firms with more tangible 
assets, i.e. ones for which active markets exist, should borrow more than firms with 
specialised, intangible assets. The reason is that the expected costs of financial 
distress depend not only on the probability of trouble, but also on the value lost if the 
trouble materializes according to observations made by Myers (1984). 
 
Another researcher puts forward a different argument in relation to Myers (1984). 
6FRWW  DUJXHV WKDW EDQNUXSWF\ FRVWV FDQ DOVR PDWHULDOLVH ZKHQ FRPSDQ\¶V
assets are not effectively sold at optimal market rates in these secondary markets 
discussed above. Companies unable to meet their obligations to their creditors are 
then very likely to have no choice but declare themselves to be bankrupt. In cases 
like this a general scenario would be one company finding that the interest payments 
of its debt was not able to be met due to a reduced flow of income this can be very 
noticeable especially for more seasonal companies. Scott (1976) does offer a solution 
for these companies which would be to issues equity such as shares in the company 
to gain the income to remedy this shortfall though it is not a long term solution. 
However, if the shortfall persists, a firm would end up declaring bankruptcy. When a 
company reaches this point its assets would be sold by the appointed receivers with 
the proceeds of these sales given to the various claimants (creditors) in a fixed order 
of priority which is decided by the type of debts and the amount each holds. This 
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VKDOO EH LPSOLHV WKDW WKH OLTXLGDWLRQ YDOXH RI ILUP¶V DVVHWV LV DOZD\V OHVV WKDQ WKH
market value of firm in operation (Scott 1976). 
 
Myers (1984) supports that the costs of financial distress can include not only legal 
and administrative costs of bankruptcy, but also less direct agency, moral hazard, 
monitoring and contracting costs, which can harm firm even when bankruptcy is 
eventually avoided. The indirect costs of bankruptcy are in the amount of time and 
effort of management taken to deal with it from more productive tasks such as 
creating income and growing the business causing the company to become reactive 
not proactive. This also has the knock on effect of creating greater reluctance in both 
the customers and suppliers to enter long-term contracts with the company (Miller 
1977). Whilst the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress defiantly exist how 
greatly they affect the capital structure decisions made by a company is still a hotly 
debated area. 
 
3) The Optimal Capital Structure 
According to the Trade-off Theory, an optimal capital structure might be achieved by 
³WUDGLQJ-RII´ WKH FRVWV DQG EHQHILWV RI GHEW %HUHQV DQG &XQ\  )DPD DQG
French, 2002, Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). In the trade-off model, companies 
equate the costs and benefits of debt and then go on to choose a debt level that 
optimises the value of the company creating the exact mix to grow the business 
whilst not allowing excess taxes and interest charges to cause a financial bottleneck. 
This is best illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
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Figure 2: The Static Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure. Source: Myers, 1984 pp 577. 
 
Debt can be seen as a positive factor therefore providing a refuge or shield from tax 
by utilising the tax breaks gained from interest payments on debts held by a 
company. This does allow a good motivator for companies to take more debt into 
their capital structure which though does not lead firms to be fully financed with 
debt. One of the reasons is that since interest payments are fixed payments, the more 
debt a firms takes, the more interest it has to pay. By reviewing the diagram on page 
six we can see a clear description of this. The straight line marked AB relates to the 
total value of the company under an all-equity financing model. When a firm 
undertakes debt it has to pay interest. Interest payments are generally tax deductible, 
hence when a firm takes GHEWLWLVDEOHWRLQFUHDVHDILUP¶VYDOXH7KLVFDQEH called 
the interest tax shield of debt. Debt almost literally shields the firm from paying out 
more taxes. Therefore, the curve marked AC shows, initially as the firm undertakes 
more debt, the value of the firm increases. 
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+RZHYHU ORRN DW WKH GRZQVLGH RI WKLV IRUP RQFH D FRPSDQ\ JHWV WR WKH µRSWLPDO¶
level of debt its value will shortly begin to drop as seen by the curve AC. Whilst 
there is no specific point that we can state that a company should not go beyond to 
truly maintain an optimal balance they should not maintain debt beyond the amount 
of their lowest period of income flow. Curve AD illustrates this by showing that the 
expense of financial distress will raise significantly when companies continuously 
borrow higher levels of debt. As the levels of debt held by a company increase they 
will find it continually harder to make repayments as the interest they are charge 
would have increased in relation to the risk as viewed by the creditors. This can 
cause an unstoppable chain reaction once too much debt is held where the risk seen 
by creditors propels a company further towards bankruptcy as more income is spent 
paying the higher rates of interest instead of reducing the debt itself. During periods 
of financial distress in a company the rise in costs mean that firms will generally plan 
to fix their debt ratios. This approach is also shown in the diagram above where the 
optimum market value of the firm is achieved when the current value of the interest 
tax shield is at a maximum. 
 
7KH µ7UDGH-2II¶ PRGHO PDNHV WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKHQ WKDW LQ UHJDUG WR FRPSDQ\¶V
optimal capital structures they will generally aim to attain this primarily through a 
target debt level. Trade-off Theory then is often referred tRDVWKH µVWDWLF7UDGH-off 
7KHRU\¶LQDQ\GRFXPHQWHGUHVHDUFK,QUHJDUGWRWKLV0\HUVVXJJHVWVWKDWD
company would substitute its debts for equity or equity for debt until they reach a 
value where the debt relief is maximized. The Trade-off theory puts a major 
emphasis on taxes. It also explains why companies paying their taxes would prefer 
some amount of borrowing (Myers, 2001). Interest payments are tax deductible and 
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thus companies that have debt in their capital structure could gain an advantage from 
DQ³LQWHUHVWWD[VKLHOG´,QWKHODFNRIDGMXVWPHQWFRVWVWKH7UDGH-off theory assumes 
WKDWDILUP¶VREVHUYHGGHEW-to-value ratio should be its optimal ratio. 
 
In summation, financially companies can become very distressed when the debt level 
becomes too high as noted previously. The repayment of interest on its debts must be 
FRQWLQXHGZKDWHYHUWKHVWDWHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VILQDQFHV7KHUHIRUHDFRPSDQ\ZKLFK
is unable to fulfill the repayments required to service its debts could face the 
possibility of bankruptcy as discussed previously. 
 
According to Fama and French, 2002, conflicts can occur within companies which 
can also have an impact on companies finances that can arise between 
stockholders/shareholders and bondholders/debt holders. This can be explained by 
the fact that if an investment pays off equity holders are the ones who will benefit 
since they are entitled to the residual profits after interest on debt has been repaid. In 
contrast, risky investments are the ones who normally have higher returns and 
therefore equity holders would prefer these types of investment. Debt holders on the 
other hand, the one who are only concerned with their interest payments, so they 
would prefer firms to choose less profitable but safe investments.  
 
In summary the benefits of debt to companies include the tax deductibility of interest 
payments (Berens and Cuny 1995). Benito (2003) says that companies that use debt 
as a means of constraining the interest of managers which may diverge from the 
interests of shareholders. Many researchers state that debt reduces free cash flow 
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problems as excess cash would be used to repay debt, rather than it being wasted on 
prerequisites (Fama and French, 2002 and Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
 
2.1.3 The Agency Cost Theory of capital structure 
 
Agency cost theories concentrate on conflict of interest. The main proposers of 
agency cost theory are Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
They identify two types of conflict: conflict between managers and shareholders and 
conflict between debt holders and equity holders. 
 
This conflict is caused by two opposing forces on one side managers/executives who 
are primarily interested in increasing the size of their areas of responsibility and 
gaining status symbols such as corporate jets cars plush offices (Harris and Raviv, 
1991). The opposing force is that of the shareholders who wish to make the 
maximum return on their investment which does not include luxuries as they see it 
IRU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V H[HFXWLYHVPDQDJHUV 7KH FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ GHEW KROGHUV DQG
equity holders arise mainly due to the fact that when an investment pays off, the ones 
to benefit are the shareholders and not the managers/executives. Conversely though 
if a company fails, debt holders are the ones to bear most of the cost. Due to this 
asymmetry in risk-sharing, equity holders prefer more risky projects that have higher 
returns, whilst debt holders prefer a more stable capital structure which assures they 
receive their interest payments regularly (Jensen, 1986 and Stulz, 1990). 
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)RUERWKSDUWLHVWKH³FRQIOLFW´FDQEHVROYHGE\FKRRVLQJDQRSWLPDOFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH
that is obtained by trading off the costs and benefits of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, Harris and Raviv, 1990)  
 
'HEWOHYHOV LQDFRPSDQ\FDQEHVHHQWRLQFUHDVHPDQDJHU¶VRZQHUVKLSRIWKHILUP
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if a firm is increasingly financed by debt, this 
implies that it consequently relies less on equity, which in turn implies that the equity 
ownership of managers (instead of shareholders) in the firm increases3. This would 
then create a situation where managers will act in the interest of the firm, as they will 
now benefit directly rather than shareholders benefiting. They also view an increase 
in debt would insinuate that cash would be more likely to be utilized to repay the 
debt, this would cause less cash then to be available to managers to engage in 
activities for their personal gain. In summary then we can see that debt increases 
managers responsibility in ensuring the company and its survival and profitability is 
their main concern (Diamond, 1984). 
 
2.1.4 Pecking-order theory of capital structure 
 
The Pecking Order Theory (POT) is another theory that attempts to explain capital 
structure decisions by reviewing and taking into account the asymmetric information 
connections which exist between different parties within the company. Manager or 
other worNHUVDUHDVVXPHG WRSRVVHVVSULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWFRPSDQ\¶V UHWXUQV
and the investment opportunities available to them (Harris and Raviv, 1991). The 
                                               
3 The underlying assumption here is that there is a trade-RIIEHWZHHQVKDUHKROGHUV¶DQGPDQDJHUV¶ 
RZQHUVKLSRIWKHILUP+HQFHLIPDQDJHUV¶RZQHUVKLSLQWKHIirm decreases this implies that 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶RZQHUVKLSLQWKHILUPLQFUHDVHV 
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Trade-off Theory does not include these ideas and therefore a variety of 
academicians have attempted to formalize a theory encapsulating this which has 
HQGHGLQWKHFUHDWLRQRIWKHµ3HFNLQJ2UGHU¶WKHRU\ 
 
 1) Asymmetric information 
Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) are leaders in researching and publishing 
works relating to the accounting of asymmetric information within a company. This 
theory relies on the fact that outsiders cannot directly observe corporate 
characteristics in sufficient detail to calculate the value of market securities. Thus 
RXWVLGHUV UDWLRQDOO\ DWWHPSW WR DVFHUWDLQ WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ YDOXH IURP observing its 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VSROLFLHVRYHUWLPHVXFKDVLWVFRUSRUDWHFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDQGYDULHW\RI
debt contracts. Then outsiders would bid competitively for corporate securities. 
Internally at the same time insiders in the company will respond to the resulting 
pricing fluctuations in their corporate securities, and pick the financing package 
which will maximise their personal gain. If a signalling equilibrium can exist, 
outsiders would therefore be able to differentiate between companies through the 
capital structure selected by optimally its management. Finally recent contributions 
in this field show that, the cost of signalling is endogenised as incremental agency 
costs arising from optimal financing-investment decisions of the firm (John, 1987). 
Furthermore recent contributions about signalling link the role of debt to bankruptcy 
(Hunsaker, 1999). 
 
 2) The pecking order of financing 
Companies which fit into the pecking order theory can be seen to prefer internal 
finance (Myers, 1984) believing this method to have a significant cost advantage 
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over new debt or equity. If external finance is required, firms first prefer to issue debt 
DQGZKHQDOORWKHU³VDIH´RSWLRQVDUHH[KDXVWHGWKH\LVVXHHTXLW\DVDODVWUHVRUWWR
solve their financial pressures. The literature regarding the POT has not been looked 
DW WKH GHWDLO VLQFH LWV LQFHSWLRQ LQ WKH HDUO\ ¶V ZKHQ LW ZDV ILUst proposed by 
0\HUVDQG0\HUVDQG0DMOXI8QWLOWKHODWH¶VDQHZLQWHUHVWKDV
been revived in the POT by financial theorists. 
Myers (1984) argues that Pecking Order theory crates an inherently strict 
KLHUDUFKLFDOVWUXFWXUHWRFRPSDQ\¶V finances: firms use internal finance first then debt 
and only when such options are exhausted, equity finance is used. This can be 
explained by the fact that internal and external finance options are not perfect 
substitutes in themselves. Below is an illustration of the Pecking Order theory which 
sums up the arguments detailed above.  
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Figure 3: Hierarchy of Source of Finance and their Costs Source: Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1998) p 156 
 
From the figure above, D1, D2 and D3 represent investment demand schedules. 
When investment demand is low at D1, investment is financed with internal funds, 
which seems relatively cheaper. If investment demand is at D2, it means that after 
exhausting the internal funds, external funds would be used namely in the form of 
debt finance. Finally, if investment demand is very high at D3, equity finance will be 
used as a final source after internal funds and debt finance have been exhausted.  
 
The hierarchical structure of this theory can be explained by a number of different 
influencing factors. There are also many factors that influence this from. For 
example, the costs associated with each form of finance which is directly influenced 
by the effect of information asymmetry to the stability of the differing types of 
finance. 
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Internal finance is seemed to be the cheapest source of finance followed by debt and 
equity. The availability of internal funds would allow firms to undertake investment 
without having to resort to external finance which is generally more costly. When 
companies resort to issuing debt or equity it usually involves heavy costs. 
 
Debt or equity released by a company leads to agency problems. The issuing of debt 
can cause conflicts to arise between managers and debt holders whereas the issuing 
of equity can cause conflicts to arise between debt holders and equity holders as 
discussed above. If a company issues external finance namely debt that involves 
repayments of both capital and interest, this can also increase the risk of financial 
distress within the organisation as noted previously. A culmination of all the above 
FDQVKRZZK\DFRPSDQ\¶VSUHIHUHQFHZRXOGEHILUVWO\WRFKRRVHLQWHUQDOUDWKHUWKDQ
external options.  
 
The majority of research into Pecking Order theory has been based around US 
companies which does limit the scope of the findings. Some of the more prominent 
international works are listed below those such as (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
Benito (2003), Chen (2003), Fama and French (2003) whose studies focused on 
Australia, China, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the UK as well as the US. These researchers 
have tried to ascertain how the Pecking Order theory relates to the capital structure of 
both large and SME businesses. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide a further interpretation of the pecking order that 
uses the asymmetric information framework argument. The argument though takes as 
granted that the management/executives at the company know everything about the 
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value and potential value of the company they manage. It also assumes that only 
insiders know the quality of a firm or its investment projects. Therefore outsiders 
require a premium if they are asked to fund these projects. The degree of information 
asymmetry regarding equity is higher when compared to debt. It could imply that the 
funding of these companies therefore creates a link between the amounts of 
information an investor holds to the value of the equity compared to the higher value 
of the debt held by the company. A solution to this is the creation of financial 
intermediaries who are able to monitor the firm and gain access to information that 
outside investors cannot get. Outside investors are generally not able to monitor a 
companies finances and this means they can not require a much higher premium on 
equity finance than debt since they are in the dark regarding the growth prospects of 
firms. 
 
Although, asymmetric information increases the cost of debt but, on the other hand, 
tax advantages have an opposing effect, Benito (2003) argues that an opposing effect 
could reduce the cost of debt relative to equity issues. The most expensive source of 
finance is seemed to be equity finance due to various costs associated with new 
equity issues. These costs consist of underwriting discounts, registration fees, taxes 
DQGVHOOLQJDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHH[SHQVHV,QUHDOLW\FRPSDQLHVZLOOWHQGWRLVVXHµVDIH¶
securities first, namely in the form of debt rather than equity. This discounts the fact 
WKRXJKWKDWQRGHEWFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVDµVDIH¶ security as there are many costs of 
ILQDQFLDO GLVWUHVV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK LW HYHQ WKRXJK LW LV VWLOO FRQVLGHUHG µVDIHU¶ WKDQ
equity. 
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Myers (1984), goes further explaining this hierarchy by the fact that firms follow the 
UXOHRI³LVVXHGHEWZKHQLQYHVWRUVXndervalue the firm and issue equity or some other 
security when they over-YDOXDWH LW´ ,QYHVWRUVDUHDZDUHRI WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQDQGGR
QRW EX\ VHFXULWLHV XQOHVV WKH\ DUH FRQYLQFHG WKDW WKH ILUP KDV H[KDXVWHG LWV ³GHEW
FDSDFLW\´ 7KHUHIRUH LQYHVWRUV ZLOO W\pically ensure that firms follow a pecking 
order. Support for the Pecking Order theory comes from the fact that most listed 
companies in the UK and Spain rarely make new equity issues according to Benito 
(2003). A flaw in the Pecking Order Theory then is that companies do not have an 
optimal capital structure. Viswanath (1993) concludes that the difference between 
investment and retained earnings should be met by debt issue. 
 
2.1.5 Other Models of Capital Structure 
 
This part focuses onto two important theories of capital structure that are based on 
the market of corporate control and the product/input market model. An important 
point missed under the agency cost models were when discussing the potential 
external forces that limit the diverging interests of managers from that of owners of 
the corporation was the threat of a takeover. Market of corporate control theory deals 
with takeover this theory emerged in 1980s when the US economy experienced a 
number of takeovers. When reviewing this area the most detailed work has been 
done by Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Israel (1991) and (Harris and Raviv, 
1991). When reviewing these works the model proposed by Israel (1991), it is the 
most widely accepted and to contrast it with two other similar models.  
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Israel (1991) has a model which revolves around the management of the company 
ZLWK D SULPDU\ JRDO RI PD[LPL]LQJ WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ YDOXH IRU LWV VKDUHKROGHUV DQG
constructs its capital structure by considering the possibility of acquisition target. 
Once the capital structure is selected, then only the potential acquirer is known about 
it. As by now the company will be aware of the true value of the company and those 
who can participate in attempting a takeover would be limited to those who could 
afford the costs involved in the acquisition process. Thus, a high ability acquirer will 
be able to pay the acquisition costs and may also participate in the acquisition 
process. The final outcome of any acquisition deal will relate to the split between the 
increases of equity value of the acquiring company to that of the target. The theory 
DVVXPHV WKDW D FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQW LV KLJKO\ FDSDEOH ZKLFK LVQ¶W DOZD\V WKH
case). Risky debt held in the capital structure of the target company will affect the 
gains to be made by the three parties which are the debt holders, acquirer and 
shareholders of the target company. High level of risky debt will drive up large 
DSSUHFLDWLRQ LQ GHEW YDOXH ZKLFK ZLOO EHQHILW WKH WDUJHW FRPSDQ\¶V GHEW KROders. 
These debts then can be sold at a fair value with the post takeover profits being 
shared between the acquirer and target shareholders respectively. Israel (1991) 
argues that the capital structure affects the outcome of the takeover processes as it 
has the potential to effect the distribution of cash flows. Israel also states that high 
levels of debt in the capital structure of target companies can result in reduced levels 
of profit for the acquiring company. The choice of optimal debt level is based on a 
trading off policy decreasing the profitability of acquisition whilst increasing the 
VKDUHRIWKHH[SHFWHGJDLQIRUWDUJHW¶VVKDUHKROGHUV 
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The other two models are those of Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) these 
are similar but with slight differences to the model of Israel (1991). The difference 
lies in the assumption of the other two models that the distribution of votes within the 
shareholders of the company may impact the outcome of the takeover contest.  
 
The product and input model theory is the next one to look at. According to the 
theory financial market and product/input market are linked together. Brander and 
Lewis (1986) have examined in detail the relationship between financial market and 
output decision in an oligopoly, they opinionated that the financial structure of a 
company can affect the output market in a variety of ways. Companies that take on 
more debt will pursue output strategies that will increase returns under positive states 
and lower returns in negative states. In negative states the company shareholders will 
tend to ignore reductions on returns since the bond holders will have claim on the 
residuals in case of bankruptcy. Hence, any changes in debt levels will affect the 
changes in the return to the shareholders and ultimately on the output strategy 
favoured by companies shareholders. In an oligopoly owner of firms will use 
financial structure as to take advantage from the output market which imply that the 
output of companies will also depend on their chances of driving their rivals to 
declare themselves bankrupt. Considering the strategies which can be used by rivals 
in the industry, a firm that ignores the importance of financial structure will have a 
lower value than a firm which realizes the importance of financial decisions. 
Furthermore the model makes the point that the structure of the credit markets could 
also impact the economic performance of output markets. This then creates an 
advantage to companies that use the interest deductibility of debt (Brander and 
Lewis, 1986). 
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7KHOLQNEHWZHHQILUPLQSXWVDQGWKHIRUPDWLRQRIDFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHKDV
been researched in detail by Titman (1984). Titman examines the relationship 
between a company (agent) and its customers (principals) who would bear the costs 
if bankruptcy occurs. Their model suggests that the company would only indirectly 
suffer the liquidation costs which would then ultimately be passed on to the 
customers in lower prices for its products in the current period. A value maximizing 
firm will become motivated to liquidate when the liquidation exceeds the value of 
not liquidated by an amount which is higher than the costs imposed on its customers 
and other associates. A non value maximizing firm, however, will liquidate when the 
assets value exceeds the value if not liquidated by any positive amount. This model 
WKHQLPSOLHVWKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHFRQWUROVWKHOLTXLGDWLRQGHFLVLRQDQG
the terms of trade with which the company does business with its customers, workers 
and suppliers. Increases in debt levels would worsen the terms of trade which the 
company could negotiate and increases the probability of liquidation. This will then 
be highly significant when a company looks at the usage of debt in its capital 
structure when deciding between debt and equity (Titman, 1984). 
 
2.2 Pharmaceuticals Economic Situations 
 
Pharmaceuticals are a significant industry, with a growing significance. Its market 
size is approaching $700 billion worldwide and it grows at annual rates between 4.5 
and 5.5 per cent. In the United States, where drug sales run at $280 billion in 2006, 
the share of prescription drugs in total national health care expenditure increased 
from 4.9% in 1980 to 10.0% in year 2004, corresponding to 1.6% of GNP (Harris, 
2008). However, because of global economic downturn in the past years, the industry 
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has been confronted to rapidly decreasing revenues. According to IMS figures, the 
United States, WKH ZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW pharmaceutical market, grew by 0.95 % to 
US$ 2008 billion. The weaker growth is attributed to the economic situation. For 
-DSDQ WKH ZRUOG¶V VHFRQG-largest pharmaceutical market, IMS Health reported 
growth of 3% to US$ 66 billion, followed by Germany, where market volume 
increased by 2% to US$ 36 billion. In France, WKHZRUOG¶VIRXUWK-largest market, drug 
sales increased by 1% to US$ 30 billion in 2008. The recent changes in global 
financial markets absolutely KDYH LPSDFWHG RQ WKH LQGXVWU\¶V OLTXLGLW\ 
(Shanmuangasundaram, 2008). Even though the pharmaceutical industry remains 
one of the most profitable and highest revenue industries, several huge expenditures 
effect WKH LQGXVWU\¶s finance situation. One of the main expenditures is the out of 
pocket for doctors and pharmaceutical physicians (Harris, 2008). The out of pocket 
expenditure is estimated to reach over $36 million by 2010, accounting for 22% of 
the pharma budget. Besides, R&D costs play as a such magnitude role in the 
LQGXVWU\¶V QDWXUH  The development of any new drugs specifically requires a 
substantial investment in research and development. The average cost of developing 
a new drug has increased from $138 million in 1975 to $803 million in 2002, 
according to the PhRMA. In 2006, North American spending on biopharmaceutical 
R&D reached a record $55.3 billion (and the US accounts for about three-quarters of 
global expenditure in this area). The member companies of the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America spent an estimated $44 billion (PhRMA, 
2009). The recent business crisis plus the numerous expenditures, these factors have 
made the companies in pharmaceutical industry try to adopt some changes in their 
capital structure (Cockburn, 2004). The issuance of external finance regarding debt 
and equity has been seen as an implication to respond to the changing economic 
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conditions (Boldrin and Levine, 2002). Pfizer reveals that LW VHHPV WREH ³D higher 
debt- to-equity ratio in comparison to that of pharma companies on the recent 
KLVWRULFDOEDVLV´3ULFHZDWHUKRXVH&RRSHUV, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERAURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter focuses on the previous empirical and theoretical studies related to the 
question raised in Chapter 1. The literary background to capture the importance of 
capital structure studies for corporations will be discussed first, and then the 
summary of the prior studies concerning the pursuit of the target capital structure will 
be presented. 
 
3.1 Literary Background 
 
Capital structure theory has been developed and discussed by several academics for 
decades. Starting with the key work of Miller and Modigliani in the late 1950s, 
finance academics have undertaken great amounts of research looking at all the 
different aspects, spending considerable time and energy in identifying what does 
and does not matter in capital structure decisions (Arsiraphongphisit et al., 1998). 
Today there is still significant debate about the costs and benefits of a more or a less 
leveraged capital structure within a company.  
 
To try and understand what determines the corporate debt ratio has long remained an 
unanswered question with no one size fits all outcome. With recent financial changes 
at the start of the 21st FHQWXU\ QHZ PHWKRGV IRU WHVWLQJ DQG UHYLHZLQJ FRPSDQ\¶V
capital structures have emerged such as in Sharma et al. (2003).  Here considerable 
time was spent studying a non-linear methodology called the neural network method. 
The main benefit and goal of this is to understand the determinants of corporate 
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ERUURZLQJ D FRPSDQ\¶V PHWKRG RI FKRRVLQJ LWV ILQDQFLQJ 3UHYLRXVO\ VWXGLHV KDYH
relied on linear statistical methods to investigate the impact of a set of variables on 
the corporate use of debt. Gilson (1997) goes further arguing that if transaction costs 
are central in the ongoing academic debate about whether firms have optimal 
leverage ratios. There are those who oppose this and argue that transaction costs are 
why companies do not immediately adjust their leverage ratios in response to 
changes within their target ratios.  
 
Recently the view that the capital structure of a company directly influences the 
investment decisions of the firm, either by providing incentives to management or by 
allocating some control of the firm to someone other than the management has 
emerged. 
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) mention that firms can be seen to change to these 
circumstances even if these changes do not necessarily make a significant difference. 
They also stated that companies who incorporate institutionalised myths are more 
legitimate, successful, and likely to survive than ones which do not. Tight control 
efforts by a company especially in highly institutionalised contexts are fixated 
conformity, both internally and externally. Such companies decouple structure from 
activity and structures from each other. The idea is that the more highly 
institutionalised the environment, the more time and energy the leaders of these firms 
VSHQGPDQDJLQJWKHLUFRPSDQ\¶VSXEOLFLPDJHDQGVWDWXV7KHDUJXPHQWFDQEHWDNHQ
further in that managers devote more time to articulating internal structures and 
relationships at an abstract or ritual level, in contrast to managing particular 
relationships among activities and interdependencies. This idea can be developed 
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into the concept that companies adjust their capital structure toward the industry 
mean in order to be the same as other companies, although the industry mean may 
not be the optimal capital structure for the company. 
 
3.2 Previous Studies on Pursuing the Target Capital Structure 
 
There have been several studies looking at whether firms pursue their target capital 
structure or not. The research also focused on the optimal capital structure with many 
researchers coming up with a variety of outcomes. Examples of some of these studies 
ORRN DW FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUHV WKDW FDQ PD[LPL]H FRPSDQ\¶V YDOXH DQG DOVR WKH XVH RI
target ratios to create an optimal capital structure for the industry as described by 
Ghosh and Cai (1999). In the pharmaceutical industry where there is little evidence 
of the utilisation of capital VWUXFWXUH WKHRU\ WR PD[LPL]H D FRPSDQ\¶V YDOXH WKLV
theory if utilised would play an important role in the industry. 
 
Many of these researchers found that a variety of financial ratios converged on 
industrial averages especially form the works of Lev (1969) and Bowen et al. (1982). 
Therefore, I have designed my study based on the choice of pursuing the target 
capital structure, which in this case is the industry mean. The literature concerns or 
supports the target capital structures are described below. 
 
The relationship between industry membership and capital structure has received 
numerous considerable attentions for many years. Starting with its first proponent 
Lev (1969), he discovered that financial ratios tended to converge on industry 
averages. In general he stated that companies would periodically adjust their ratios 
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toward their individual industry means. He further argued that equity to debt ratios 
are more difficult to control and that it may take more time for them to adjust than 
most other financial ratios. 
 
Five separate industries were documented by Schwartz and Aronson (1967) to 
contain a relationship between industry and capital structure. Hamada (1972) took 
this and expanded on it by using industry membership as a substitute for risk class, in 
doing so he found that levered beta values within different industries varied more 
than unlevered beta values. He then concluded that there was a significant 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHFRVWRIHTXLW\DQGDFRPSDQ\¶VILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJH 
 
Lev and Pekleman (1975) took this onward when they reported a problem that is 
raised by the existence of an equity-debt (ED) ratio in that there would have to be 
found an optimal adjustment policy to control it. This can be seen I the following 
example where the incidence of unexpected income changes would result in a 
deviation between the actual and target ratio. They also argued that in the absence of 
any constraints or adjustment costs a company will instantly adjust its ED ratio to the 
target whenever a deviation occurs. This though is not practical and a balance would 
have to be sought between the cost of adjusting the ED ratio itself and the cost of 
letting the deviation from the target remain unchecked. This can be seen then as the 
main reason for the construction of a model that would create an automatic optimal 
adjustment of the ED ratio. Their empirical results when dissected seem to concur 
WKDW D FRPSDQ\¶V EHKDYLRXU LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH PRGHOV LQ UHVSHFW WR GHEW DQG
dividend decisions. 
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7KHPDLQK\SRWKHVLVRI%RZHQHWDOZDVDOVRWKDWILUP¶VGHEWVWUXFWXUHVWHQG
to converge to the industry mean over time. They used the Fisher Exact Probability 
test to examine two measures of firm leverage (common equity divided by total 
assets and long term plus short term debt divided by total assets). This specifically 
looked at whHWKHUDFRPSDQ\¶V OHYHUDJHZDVDERYHRUEHORZ LWV LQGXVWU\PHDQDQG
ZKHWKHUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VOHYHUDJHZDVREVHUYHGWRFKDQJHDIWHUDIL[HGSHULRGRIWLPH
This thereby allowed researchers to see if an average company moved towards or 
away from the industry mean over time. The tests they ran found that on changes 
occurring over one year intervals they found no significant signs of convergence. 
However when the length of time was increased the results showed a highly 
significant outcome. The conclusion of the study was that companies do indeed show 
a statistically significant tendency toward their industry mean over an increased time 
period. 
 
Marsh (1982) supported this research stating that that companies appear to make 
their choice of financing instrument as though they had target levels in mind for both 
long term debt ratios and short term debt to total debt ratio. He did though argue that 
company internal and external characteristics served to predict the debt or equity 
form of the next capital expansion. He also concluded that market conditions and 
past history of security prices appear to be far more influential in this choice than the 
firm's existing financial structure. 
 
,Q WXUQ 0DUVK¶V VWXG\ ZDV VXSSRUWHG E\ -DOLOYDQG DQG +DUULV  0DUNHW
imperfections such as adjustment costs or constraints may lead firms not to adjust 
completely to the long term targets in every period, but to follow a pattern of partial 
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adjustment instead. They pointed out that the firm's targets are one of the many key 
drivers in helping companies make their financial decisions. 
 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) used this work to argue for the presence of an 
industry-related optimal capital structure. They went further though to also imply 
that it is the tax code and tax rate differences across industries that cause the inter-
industry similarities in leverage ratios. 
 
The relationship of capital structure to industry membership and the DeAngelo-
Masulis differential tax arguments have been reviewed by several researchers. 
Although Boquist and Moore's (1984) could not find data which supported the tax 
shield hypothesis at the firm level, they found weak evidence in support of the theory 
at the industry level. Their finding reveals that total leverage varies across industry 
groupings. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) supported this hypothesis that whilst it is widely accepted 
that firms in a particular industry will have similar leverage ratios, leverage ratios 
will vary considerably across industries. Harris and Raviv (1991) have also 
summarized findings of four separate studies written by Bowen et al. (1982), Bradley 
et al. (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), and Kester (1986), which investigated 
leverage ratios in selected industries. These studies as the work above found that 
specific industries have a common leverage ratio that remains relatively stable over 
long periods of time. 
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Two competing theories optimal capital structure and pecking order theory were 
examined in work by Claggett (1991) to see which is better at explaining a 
FRPSDQ\¶V FDSLWDO VWructure decisions. He took research by Bowen et al. (1982), 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Lev (1969), and Marsh (1982) and expanded on it. He 
found that given capital structures typically converge toward the industry average 
and they do not always as before thought necessarily converge symmetrically. For 
these theories to work effectively we must see periods of asymmetric convergence 
which are required for simultaneous optimal capital structure and pecking order 
behaviour to function. Claggett (1991) concludHGWKDWDFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHV
would either move towards industry averages or follow the pecking order, though 
WKLV PD\EH VHHQ WRRYHU VLPSOLI\ WKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIDFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH
decisions. 
 
A model was proposed by Davis and Peles (1993) to estimate the industry and 
management impact on ratio adjustment. The model they created has the ability to 
allow each company to have its own equilibrium value of a financial ratio. This 
model also relies primarily on the extent of mean reversion in financial ratio series to 
conclude whether the equilibrium target exists in the first place. Although the model 
by Davis and Peles provided a more flexible framework for estimating the 
adjustment rates of financial ratios, Wu and Ho (1997) stated a variety of issues 
remain unresolved by it. If we look at the industry effect this was not measured 
properly, a more appropriate way of measuring the industry effect would have been 
WR H[DPLQH WKH VHQVLWLYLW\ RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V UDWLR WR FKDQJHV LQ WKH LQGXVWU\
condotion. Davis and Peles study used the following analysis in its modelling which 
is that the industry effect on ratio adjustment is represented by the mean-reverting 
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rate of the industry average ratio itself. Their model fails also to address the issues of 
the process of converging to the long-term steady state equilibrium, most importantly 
though it ignores the cross-sectional reliance in the financial ratio movement. 
 
When we take Wu and Ho (1997) model into account we can see both the passive 
adjustment and active management components of ratio movement are captured by 
the partial adjustment coefficient. This partial adjustment coefficient can then be 
XVHGWRPHDVXUHDPDQDJHU¶VDELOLW\WRFRUUHFWWKHGHYLDWLRQRIFXUUHQWILQDQFLDOUDWLRV
from the industry wide average. Financial ratio adjustments were given to be either 
an active attempt by managers to reach the target or passive industry-wide effects 
operating on the firms that are out of equilibrium. In regard to the adjustment of 
financial ratios to the targets they argued that the evidence from most previous 
studies has failed to distinguish between the passive adjustment to external shocks 
and the active strategic control of financial ratios by management. This has resulted 
LQ WKH DPRXQW RI FRPSDQ\¶V being able to adjust their ratios to the optimal target 
level in the short term being overstated as previous studies had ignored this 
GLIIHUHQFH&RPSDQ\¶VRIWHQXVHWKHILQDQFLDOUDWLRVRIRWKHUILUPVWRFDOLEUDWHWKHLU
desired level of financial ratios using the fact that if it works well for them it will for 
us. 
 
Numerous studies since Hatfield et al. (1994) have stated that there is a documented 
relationship between industry and capital structure, research into this relationship 
may uncover determinants of capital structure. They also proposed that in a particular 
industry companies will have similar ratios of both individual assets and liabilities. 
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In addition to this Dissanaike et al. (2001) researched debt dynamics in which target 
the adjustment and short-run flow-of-funds coefficients, finding that these may vary 
greatly across companies. Factors of relevance to the target capital structure in this 
are as follows; Market-to-Book Value, Size, Liquidity, and Comparison of Long-run 
Debt Target Effects. Trade-off, agency and scale theories were also seen to be in play 
in the determination of target debt, as measured by proxy variables. Target debt 
determinants were those such as scale effects which strongly dominate both the 
effect of market-to-book value and proportion of liquid assets variables. 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) showed that on average 81% of companies consider a 
target debt ratio or target range when making their debt decisions. 
 
This focused the work of Flannery and Rangan (2004) who created a relatively 
general, partial-adjustment model of company leverage and deciding that companies 
do indeed have target capital structures. Their data showed that an average company 
reduces the gap between its actual and target debt ratios by a third within one year. 
This targeted behaviour according to their research can definitively explain the 
FKDQJHVREVHUYHG LQDFRPSDQ\¶VFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH LQD IDUPRUHFOHDUDQGDFFXUDWH
way than viewing the market timing or pecking order considerations. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
From reviewing the literature review, I found the gap of researches that have not yet 
been conducted in my interesting industry²Pharmaceuticals. The pattern of debt-
equity ratios in the specific industry should be discussed and investigated in depth. 
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Do pharmaceutical firms follow the target capital structure? These are the questions 
that should be answered.  
  
  
48 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
As a result of reviewing prior studies and literature research, it is important to test 
1) whether pharmaceutical companies adjust their debt-equity ratios toward the 
target ratios or not and  
2) The target ratios they adjust to are the industry average.  
These criteria above can be tested under the research method of utilising secondary 
quantitative data. 
 
This methodology designs and adapts the partial adjustment model by Lev (1969) to 
test whether industry average is the target for financial ratios. This methodology is 
relied on the assumption that DILUP¶VGHEW-equity ratios follow the target ratios. 
 
To answer this question, the statistics program employed to test the hypothesis is 
SPSS, which will be adopted to calculate statistical scores and test a series of 
hypothesis. This statistical package programme is also used to analyse the standard 
statistic values, regression and probability to assess the strength of relationships 
between variables. The statistical results of regression tests are presented in the 
Appendix B as a reference. 
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4.1 Hypotheses 
 
The data and methodology used in this empirical study is adapted with some 
adjustments from Lev¶V PRGHO  )URP WKH TXHVWLRQ UDLVHG LQ &KDSWHU  WKLV
report develops the hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis : The pharmaceutical companieV¶GHEW-equity ratios converge toward the 
target ratios which in this case is the industry mean over time. 
 
The hypothesis will be accepted when the adjustment coefficient for the ratios is 
statistically significant (at the 10 percent significant level). 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
 
The sources of data for this study are annual reports filed in the Form of 10-K or 20-
) ZKLFK DUH REWDLQHG IURP WKH FRPSDQ\¶V RIILFLDO ZHEVLWHV DQG WKH EDGAR--the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system provided by the SEC. The 
sample needs to contain at least eleven consecutive accounting years of accounting 
year listed in the U.S. SEC covering the period 1998 to 2008. However, from my 
data sources, many firms have no available financial information prior to 1998.  
 
There are numerous advantages of this dataset such as the faster search times, the 
access to updated information, as well as the comparability which is the objective of 
investigation the changes between two periods. However, the disadvantages of this 
dataset are that some data are not electronically available, or data might be 
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influenced by market sentiment which varies during the different periods. The 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHQHVV RI WKH UHVXOW¶V interpretation could be affected by these factors 
(Saunders et al, 2003). 
 
4.2.1 Classification of Firms into the Industry 
 
The study conducts in the U.S. can gain benefits by employing the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which provide an exogenous means for 
grouping firms into functionally defined industries (Bowen et al., 1982). The data 
utilizing in this report is pharmaceutical companies listed in the SEC with the 
standard industrial classification code of 2834²pharmaceutical preparation. 
 
4.2.2 Limitations of Data 
 
Before citing any concluding comments, it is important to acknowledge and discuss 
some limitations of the data. The data is limited to the U.S. listed firms, and the 
capital budgeting practices of listed firms is not likely to be representative of non 
listed firms . 
 
Therefore, the samples are restricted to those companies which met the following 
requirements: 
1) The full 11 \HDUV¶ financial data are available from year 1998-2008; 
7KH ILUP¶VWRFNVKDYHEHHQ OLVWHGRU traded in the Stock Exchange of the U.S.A 
since 1998 or earlier and still trade until 2008; 
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The first requirement is defined since the linear regression analysis is applied in this 
study to each individual company. A small number of observations could cause the 
results statistically meaningless. The second requirement is relied on the restriction 
of IPO issuing year. The reason because the IPO activity is associated with a large 
number of the issuances of equity, that may cause a change in debt-equity structure 
of the firms.  
 
However, the requirement for continuous data might cause the bias towards the 
larger and more established firms. However, this report does not attempt to claim that 
the report is the representative for all global pharmaceutical companies. 
 
4.3 Measurements of Debt-Equity Structure 
 
 A study by Lev (1969) shows that the financial ratios are not directly concerned with 
the capital structure, however, the research by Ghosh and Cai (1999) argue that the 
measurement of capital structure can be carried out from the financial ratios.  This 
dissertation, therefore, apply three ratios IURP WKH *KRVK DQG &DL ¶s study 
including long-term debt to total assets (LTD/TA), total debt to total assets (TD/TA), 
and total equity to total assets (TE/TA). Debt-to-capital ratio (which is equivalent to 
debt to total assets) is focused because it has received enormous interest from firm 
management and academic scholars. This report also applies the basic debt to equity 
ratio to test the hypothesis because it is presented as a financial highlight in the 
annual reports of many companies. Thus, it is widely accepted that debt to equity 
ratio is important and also give the meaningful for firms in term of capital structure. 
There are three types of debt-equity ratios presenting in this report. They include 
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short-term debt to total equity (STD/TE), long-term debt to total equity (LTD/TE), 
and total debt to total equity (TD/TE).  
 
Many researches note that it could be better if market values were available for debt 
which may have improved the model fit (Reimoo, 2008). However, research by 
Paulauskas (2008) argues that there is no significant difference founding between 
book or market ratios. Because almost all financial information presented in 
FRPSDQLHV¶ILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWLVUHSRUWHGLQERRNYDOXHWhis dissertation, therefore, 
uses book value of debt in measuring leverage rather than market values. Table 1 
below illustrates the six financial ratios and a brief statistical description of the data. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Financial ratios 
Ratio Category Ratio Description 
1. Debt to total asset ratio  1. Long-term debt to total asset ratio 
2. Total debt to total asset ratio 
2. Debt to equity ratio 1. Short-term debt to total equity ratio 
2. Long-term debt to total equity ratio 
3. Total debt to total equity ratio 
3. Equity to total asset ratio 1. Total Equity to total asset ratio 
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4.4 Statistical Applications 
 
The hypothesis SUHVHQWLQJ LQ WKLV UHSRUW LV WKDW SKDUPDFHXWLFDO FRPSDQLHV¶ debt 
equity structures tend to converge to the pharmaceutical industry mean over time. 
The aim of this study is to analyse whether the firms exhibit a statistically significant 
tendency to move toward the industry mean over time periods, or not. Therefore, I 
employ the industry average as a proxy for target debt-equity ratios and apply the 
partial adjustment model to statistically test the hypothesis. The results of this test 
would be interpreted into two kinds which are individual firm analysis and panel 
dataset analysis. 
 
The Partial Adjustment Model by Lev (1969) 
Many economists have employed this model in a wide variety of empirical research 
concerned with the dynamic properties of the variables tested. A brief description of 
the model is defined below. 
 
Let y is some relevant and observable variables which is adjusted over time to a 
target, which is denoted by y*, this can be defined as 
 
yt - yt-1 = E(y t* - yt-1), E 0< 1                                        [l] 
 
The model assumes that at any particular time period t, only a fixed fraction of the 
desired adjustment is accomplished. This fixed fraction (the coefficient of adjustment 
E) presents the fact that there are limitations to the periodic adjustment of y caused 
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by technological and institutional constraints. Let the target, yt*, is determined by 
some other observable variable Xt-1, it is therefore specified as follows:  
 
yt* =  Xt-1                                                                        [2] 
 
The combination of [1] and [2] defines the partial adjustment model as illustrated 
below:  
 
yt - yt-1 = E(Xt-1 - yt-1 )                                                             [3] 
 
In this adjustment equation, yt  is the observed value of a financial ratio at time t, yt * 
is the value of the target ratio for time t, and Xt-1 is assumed to be  the industry mean 
of the ratio which determines the target according to [2]. Therefore, the composition 
of equation [3] LV JRYHUQHG E\ D FRPSDQ\¶V REVHUYHG deviation that is the value 
between its ratio and the industry mean (Xt-1- yt-1). The industry mean (Xt-1- yt) will 
also adjust its ratio in the next period (yt) so that the observed deviation will be partly 
eliminated. 
 
Primarily, when equation [3] is applied to real data and the estimated E falls between 
0 and 1, it can indicates that the firm adjusts the year-to-year differences in the ratio 
according to the industry mean. The speed of adjustment is determined by the size of 
EIf E is closer to 1, it reflects the faster speed the periodic adjustment. Therefore, 
this model could be used to test whether firms tend to adjust their financial ratios to 
the industry average. 
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However, the partial adjustment model may cause several problems of estimation 
because of its autoregressive form. The presence in [3] of the lagged variable yt-1 as 
an explanatory variable is an example. When such a lagged variable is contained in 
the model there are causes to expect a bias in the estimated regression coefficients 
and their standard errors. Despite these statistical problems, this model has been 
widely accepted by many researchers because of its mathematical convenience and 
the absence of more adequate models. 
 
To analyse the secondary data (leverage ratios), regression analysis is applied in this 
study. Regression analysis is a technique that studies the relationship between two or 
more variables. It is clear that the main purpose of this technique is to predict the 
behaviour of a dependent variable, which relies on one independent variable. If more 
independent variables have been involved, the regression model will become a 
multiple regression model. However, only simple regression model is deployed to 
WHVW WKH GLVVHUWDWLRQ¶V K\SRWKHVLV  The statistical package used for this analysis is 
SPSS program which allows the user to perform simple linear regression analysis. 
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4.4.1 Simple Regression Model 
 
By adopting the partial adjustment model, the simple regression model is used to 
estimate the coefficients of this hypothesis for each of the 15 firms in the sample. 
 
Log  yk ,t ± log yk,t-1 = D+ E (log Xk,t-1 ± log yk,t-1) + Ut                        [4] 
                    t =  «1 and k  « 
 
Where, yk ,t     =  the firm's financial ratio k for the year t, 
            Xk,t-1    = the arithmetic mean of the ratio k for the industry in year t-1, 
            Ut       = an error term assumed to meet the least-squares model requirements, 
          And   k - «UHSUHVHQWVWKHVL[ILQDQFLDOUDWLos tested. 
 
The logarithmic form (Natural logarithm) can be applied for capturing the relative 
yearly changing in the ratio. Because this study deals with the adjustments of 
deviations from a target, it might be reasonable to assume that the relative deviations 
are more significant to the firm than the absolute ones. A constant D added to 
equation [4] is measured the average growth rate. In the next chapter, the results of 
this hypothesis will be presented by individual firm and then use the panel dataset to 
estimate the overall results. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The objective of this study is to test the hypothesis in that the pharmaceutical 
companies in the sample converge to the industry mean, but the techniques by which 
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firms adjust their ratios are not investigated here. It might be recognized that the ratio 
adjustment can be achieved by several approaches. The passive adjustment by 
allowing industry-wide effects to operate on the ratios is one of the examples. 
Although the sample companies are in the same industry, it is difficult to identify a 
specific technique utilizing in such a heterogeneous sample which probably differ 
from firm to firm. Nevertheless, irrespective of the adjustment techniques employed, 
the usefulness of this study primarily lies in its conducive contribution to the growth 
of a general model describing the behaviour of financial ratios. A prediction of ratios 
on the basis of the variables investigation will be allowed to apply in such a model 
(Lev, 1969). 
 
In conclusion, the six financial ratios are used in order to capture the book value of 
debt, equity, and assets which are known as the debt-equity structure. The simple 
regression model is the statistical methodology applied to analyse the secondary 
information in regard to leverage ratios. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter shows the empirical results of the regression analysis developed from 
the Partial Adjustment Model. The graph of industry average ratios will be illustrated 
and discussed first, and then the detail of the hypothesiV¶ UHJUHVVLRQ results for of 
individual firms and panel dataset will be explained. 
 
5.1 The Leverage Ratios Analysis 
 
In Appendix A, reporting the mean of six financial leverage ratios, which cover 15 
companies. Firm leverage is estimated by the ratio of the mean level of short-term 
and long-term debt (book value) during 1998-2008. These data are collected and 
calculated by using the function in excel package programme to generate the graph 
(see in figure 4). 
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Figure4:  Industry means by financial ratios 
  
 
The figure above presents the leverage ratios of companies in pharmaceutical 
industry. The patterns of debt and equity ratios of our sampling data can be discussed 
as follows. In overall, most of the leverage ratios present in the same pattern, which 
show the sharp decreases in 2000 then steep rises in 2002 and became steady again 
after 2006.  Overall, TE/TA ratios present the highest proportion for almost of all 
periods. It is consistent with the results from %UHDOH\HWDOZKRVWDWHWKDW³LWLV
rare to find a pharmaceutical company that is not predominantly equity-ILQDQFHG´
Conversely STD/TE present the lowest proportion compared to other leverage ratios. 
These ratios (STD/TE) seem to be stable throughout the whole sample period. Turn 
to see debt to equity ratios which have the most significant fluctuation over the 
period. TD/TE ratios consist of STD/TE and LTD/TE in which long-term debt has 
much higher level compared to short-term debt. Therefore, trends of LTD/TE ratios 
were prominent part in TD/TE. 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Industry Means By Financial Ratios
LTD/TA
TD/TA
STD/TE
LTD/TE
TD/TE
TE/TA
  
60 
 
5.2 The Hypothesis Statistical Results   
 
According to the Hypothesis ³7KH FRPSDQLHV¶ GHEW-equity ratios converge toward 
the target ratios which in this case LVWKHLQGXVWU\PHDQRYHUWLPH´ 
 
In this section will show the Hypothesis result of all 6 leverage ratios as mentioned in 
Chapter 4. This test examines whether individual companies in the same industry 
would converge their debt-equity ratios toward their industry mean. The results of 
the tests obtain from the simple regression analysis. Each company is taken into the 
regression model by the industry leverage ratios act as their target financial structure. 
 
To achieve the results, this report applies the simple regression model:  
Log  yk ,t ± log yk,t-1 = D+ E (log Xk,t-1 ± log yk,t-1) + Ut                         
 
5.2.1 Explanation of results 
 
In order to interpret the regression results, it is necessary to understand the 
indications of the parameters. First of all this model takes logarithm form since it 
compares the results in form of the differences of the percentage.  If the percentage 
increases by 1% when compare the target ratios with WKHODVW\HDUFRPSDQ\¶VUDWLR, it 
would cause the increasing of % changes between FRPSDQ\¶V ratio this year 
compared to last year for E %. Second, if the coefficient E shows the result between 
0 and 1, the firm periodically adjusts its ratio to the industry mean but has not yet  
achieved the target. However, if the coefficient E is below 0, this indicates that the 
FRPSDQ\¶V ratios move away from the target. However, if the coefficient E is over 1, 
  
61 
 
it shows the overshooting of adjustment rate. Third, the size of coefficient E is 
integrated with the marginal significance level of E (probability or p-value), the 
hypothesis is accepted in case the probability of t-statistic is less than 0.10 
(confidence at 0.10, 0.05, or 0.01 percent). If not, it shows WKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VUDWLRLV
not adjusting toward the target ratio (see the regression results in Appendix B). The 
analytical results by individual firm for each ratio are summarised as below: 
 
1) LTD/TA ratios 
For LTD/TA ratios, the number of firms that have a coefficient E falling between 0 
and 1and which is statistically significant is only 3 out of 15 firms. There is only one 
firm that has a coefficient E > 1 (overshoot). The D coefficient is found to be small in 
all cases, and no firm demonstrates statistically significant.  The R2 is relatively small 
for all of the companies in the results. Hence, we can conclude that there is no strong 
support for ratios adjustment to target ratio. 
 
2) TD/TA ratios 
For TD/TA ratios, the number of firms that have a coefficient Elying between 0 and 
1 and statistically significant is 6 out of 15 firms. However, there is one company 
that has a coefficient E >1. The D coefficient is found to be small in all cases and no 
firm shows statistically significant. The R2 is relatively small for all of the firms in 
the results. This result shows that there is still no strong support WKDW FRPSDQ\¶V
TD/TA ratios adjust itself toward industry mean. 
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3) STD/TE ratios 
For STD/TE ratios, the number of companies that present a coefficient E falling 
between 0 and 1 and show the statistically significant, which means they are 
adjusting their STD/TE ratios toward industry is 5 out of 15 firms. Only 2 out of 15 
ILUPVWKDWVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWKDYHDҏFRHIILFLHQWE > 1 (overshooting), and no firm 
has a coefficient E < 0 (move away). The D coefficient is found to be small in most 
case, however, and only 3 firms are statistically significant (all of them show 
negative sign). The R2 is relatively small for all of the companies in the results. 
Consequently, there is no strong support for ratios adjustment to target ratio.  
 
4) LTD/TE ratios 
For LTD/TE ratios, the number of companies that have a coefficient E lying between 
0 and 1 and show statistically significant (adjust their LTD/TE ratios toward the 
industry mean) is only 3 out of 15 firms. However, there is one company shows a 
coefficient E > 1. The D coefficient is found to be small in all cases but no firm is 
statistically significant. The R2 is not large for any of the companies in the results. 
7KLVUHVXOWGRHVQRWVKRZVWURQJVXSSRUWWKDWFRPSDQ\¶V/7'7(UDWLRVDGMXVWLWVHOI
toward industry mean. 
 
5) TD/TE ratios 
For TD/TE ratios, I find the number of firms that have a coefficient E lying between 
0 and 1 and which is statistically significant are 6 out of 15 firms. In addition no firm 
has either coefficient E >1 or E <1. The D coefficient is found very small in all cases, 
and 2 firms show significant (both of them show negative sign). The R2 is relatively 
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small for all of the firms in the results. Thus, we can conclude that there is no strong 
support for these ratios adjusting to the target ratio. 
 
6) TE/TA ratios 
For TE/TA ratios, the number of firms that have a coefficient E falling between 0 and 
1 and which is statistically significant is only 6 out of 15 firms. However, there are 3 
firms that have a coefficient E >1 but no firm has a coefficient E < 0. The D 
coefficient is found to be very small in all cases. There are 4 firms presenting 
statistically significant (half of them show positive sign). The R2 is relatively small 
for all of the companies in the results. Hence, this result reveals no strong support 
tKDWFRPSDQ\¶V7(7$UDWLRVDGMXVWLWVHOIWRZDUGindustry mean. 
 
5.2.2 Summary of Statistical Results 
 
The table below shown summarizes the distribution of parameter estimates obtained 
when equation [4] is applied to the panel dataset. The common type of standard 
deviation2 (VAR) in excel programme is used to generate the result of the pooled. 
Although, many studies apply pooled statistic estimation to investigate the 
distribution among different groups of data, the pooled parameter can be applied to 
this analysis. The reason for this could be that although the sample company 
observed is in the same industry²pharmaceuticals, most companies in the sample do 
not operate in the same country, so they face with the different regulations and 
circumstances.  This fact leads us to apply a pooled statistic estimation to examine 
the probability distribution for sample data in this report. The test results of the six 
ratios are illustrated in the six panels shown in the table 2. In the below, columns 1 
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and 3 present the distribution of the estimated regression coefficients, while columns 
2 and 4 show the distribution of t-values such as the ratios of coefficients to 
estimated standard errors. The final column shows the distribution of the coefficient 
of determination (R2). The six summary statistics are corresponded to each parameter 
including the pooled estimation, the mean, and the median. Table 2 showed in the 
next page is the results of panel distribution of regression coefficients for equation 
[4] 
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Table 2:  Panel Distribution of Regression Coefficients for Equation (4) 
Ratio Mean and  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
  Median D tD   E t(E)   R2 
LTD/TA Pooled 0.01843 0.83877 * 0.11538 0.87752 * 0.03367 
  Mean -0.06773 -0.09607   0.49720 1.53533   0.24853 
  Median 0.01200 0.19100   0.48100 1.60900   0.24500 
TD/TA Pooled 0.01219 1.00693 * 0.09636 0.48775 ** 0.02191 
  Mean -0.03667 -0.04200   0.56273 1.56953   0.27067 
  Median 0.00600 0.03000   0.49500 1.73300   0.27300 
STD/TE Pooled 0.34882 1.32375 * 0.17922 2.12281   0.06755 
  Mean -0.44273 -1.04987   0.65473 1.64920   0.33273 
  Median -0.27800 -1.00900   0.76200 1.93000   0.36300 
LTD/TE Pooled 0.03405 0.72024 * 0.11687 0.94591   0.03773 
  Mean -0.10653 -0.31593   0.44000 1.37467   0.21720 
  Median -0.02900 -0.39300   0.42900 1.50500   0.22100 
TD/TE Pooled 0.03352 1.07158 * 0.07111 0.51745 ** 0.02232 
  Mean -0.10273 -0.47813   0.55107 1.53820   0.25400 
  Median -0.03100 -0.34100   0.54600 1.41700   0.20100 
TE/TA Pooled 0.00624 2.79765 * 0.20526 1.68585 * 0.04725 
  Mean -0.01353 0.12940   0.67773 1.87387   0.32800 
  Median -0.00300 -0.14200   0.62400 2.08800   0.35300 
* = 0.10, ** = 0.05, and *** = 0.01 significant level 
 
1) This empirical study concentrates on the partial adjustment coefficient E. Since it 
mentioned earlier that 0 < E < 1 can be implied that the company periodically adjusts 
its ratio to the industry mean. The data in Table 2 above shows the periodic 
adjustment hypothesis; the pooled coefficient E of all ratios fall between 0 and 1 and 
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all data have statistical significance. The mean of the coefficient E for all ratios lie 
between 0 and 1. If look at the column (3), all the E coefficients have positive sign 
which can indicates that the average adjustment rate had moved towards the industry 
mean. 
 
2) The probability of t(E) values show the statistical significance of the adjustment 
coefficient. The coefficients for all of the 6 ratios (considering individual firm) are 
not statistically significant. Only about 30% of the firms for each ratio are significant 
in the sample. However, when considering the pooled estimation, t-statistic of 
TD/TE and TD/TA shown the significant level at 0.05, while that of LTD/TA and 
TE/TA are significant at 0.1 level. These indicate the strong support of the ratios 
adjustment. 
 
3) The D coefficients (constant) are very small in all and t-statistics of all ratios are 
significant at 0.1 level. However, from Table 2 shows that all of the ratios have 
positive a coefficient. 
 
4) The coefficient of determination, R2 shows the result that it is not large for the any 
ratios used in this study. From the pooled estimation, R2 for all ratios are very small, 
the mean of STD/TE ratios has the largest coefficients (median R2 =  0.363). This 
reflects the existence of additional explanatory variables which are not involved in 
the equation [4]. The objective of this study is to examine the periodic adjustment 
hypothesis, though it doest not aim to develop a prediction model for debt-equity 
ratios. This study focuses on the E coefficients, therefore the modest R2 is not in a 
great concern. 
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5) The size of the E coefficient indicates the speed of adjustment to the target ratio. 
Accordingly, it seems that the closerE is to 1, the faster the periodic adjustment. The 
study by Lev (1969) shows that the cost of adjustment can reflects the degree of 
difficulty in a quick adjustment of the financial ratio to a predetermined target. 
However, the results of the test show that all ratios in this analysis have a moderate 
speed of adjustment. This is because the changes of the capital structure of any listed 
companies needs the decisions of board of directors and public concerning. In this 
regards, they cannot be adjusted in the short run easily. Moreover, in this study the 
speeds of adjustment are relatively slow for the pooled estimation results. The cost of 
being out of equilibrium indicates how importance of the conformity of a ratio with a 
target to the company. For instance, if lenders insist on a 1:1 TD/TE ratio, then the 
cost of a firm which denies to conform this standard will be higher the interest rates 
charge. Therefore, the speed of adjustment of a ratio probably depends on the relative 
significance of other variables which are not discussed in detail here. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
Research by Bowen et al. (1982) reveals that the industry mean financial structure 
ratios tend to maintain their relative position over time. Accordingly, the stability of 
the means over time becomes consistent with the hypothesis citing that similar firms 
tend to remain a given amount of leverage in their financial structure. However, 
stability is also in line with the use of historical accounting data and the possible 
issuance of new securities by at least one company. 
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Many researchers point out that companies adjust their financial ratios according to 
industry-wide averages. So, if firms leverage their target ratio, it might imply that 
firms try to adjust toward these targets over time. To answer the question raised in 
the Chapter1 that ³Is there any evidences that firms in pharmaceutical industry will 
adapt or adjust their debt-equity structure to a target level (which in this case is the 
industry mean)?´. The result of the hypothesis reveals that there is small evidence 
confirming that debt-equity ratios of the 15 pharmaceutical firms in the sample 
FRQYHUJH WR WKH LQGXVWU\ PHDQ +RZHYHU WKH UHVXOWV VXSSRUW WKDW PRVW FRPSDQLHV¶
ratios are moving toward the target ratio, rather than moving away. 
 
When considering individual firms, the results of hypothesis give no strong 
evidences to DQVZHU WR WKH GLVVHUWDWLRQ¶V question. To gain absolute conclusion 
regarding the aspecWWKDW³7KHGHEW-equity structure of pharmaceutical firms may or 
PD\ QRW FRQYHUJH WR WKH LQGXVWU\ PHDQ´ a larger sample sizes are required. 
Moreover, Marsh (1982) discovered that the implication for target debt levels and 
issue behaviour can be identified as follows. First, any overall change in tax levels 
would affect issuing companies to shift their preference towards either debt or equity. 
Second, the probability of financial distress can influence the target debt levels 
because the distress is a function of both operating and financial risk. It may be 
inferred that a company with high operating risk expect to use less debt. Besides, 
target levels would be themselves functions of company size, bankruptcy risk, and 
asset composition. 
 
Nevertheless, the pooling regression in Table 2 represented the average of speed 
adjustment coefficients of all companies shows a stronger evidence for the 
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adjustment. All results of the ratios have statistically significant movement toward 
the industry mean. In Table 2, the pooled estimates of D coefficient do show to be 
lower than 0 for all ratios.  
 
According to Wu and Ho (1997), in reality, most companies in different industries 
are subject to varying degrees of economic and political shocks. Those companies 
may adopt certain accounting choices traditionally followed within each industry 
because the selection of accounting procedures will definitely impact the figures in 
financial statements. So, the debt-equity ratio behaviours may vary even in the same 
industry. Moreover, government regulation on certain industries may influence to 
management GHFLVLRQWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWFRPSDQLHV¶SROLF\FRPSO\VPRRWKUDWLRV 
 
Generally, companies requiring new finance should issue equity if they are above 
their target debt level and/or debt if their debts are below. Without floatation costs, 
such adjustments need to revise instantly and continuously. In practice the existence 
of significant floatation costs stimulates the companies to minimize both floatation 
costs and costs of deviating from their target ratio. This also implies that companies 
should consider not only current but also future debt-equity ratios (Lev, 1969). In 
empirical work, it seems important to identify what the target level is. However, 
because of time constraints, this dissertation can only adopt past behaviours and 
develop the theory of capital structure for help. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The capital structure issues have received enormous interest from firms and 
academic scholars. Numerous empirical studies as Titman (1984) as well as Brealey 
and Myers (2004) refer that WKH ILUP¶s choice of capital structure is a issue of 
practical guidelines. Therefore it seems to be WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI D FRPSDQ\¶V 
financial manager to find the right financial mixes which appeal to investors, or 
ultimately maximize the market value of the company. To gain an insight into how 
pharmaceutical companies actually choose between debt and equity, this dissertation 
attempts to analyses the financing pattern, in particular the debt-equity structures, of 
15 listed companies in the SEC from the period of 1998 to 2008. The dissertation 
employs linear regression method to explore the adjustment of 6 debt-equity ratios 
across firms and over time to the target ratios. This chapter mainly focuses on the 
empirical findings from the study and provides some suggestions for further 
researches. 
 
6.1 Principal Findings of the Study 
 
In this dissertation, the empirical results of the regression analysis are not entirely in 
line with a target capital structure theory from existing theories and previous studies. 
The partial adjustment model applied into the study is partly accounted for the 
observed debt-equity structure of pharmaceutical companies. 
 
In general, the model in this dissertation comes up with a relatively low explanatory 
power (R2 is around 0.3). The empirical result seems to indicate that there is no 
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adequate evidence for individual firms to support that the sample firms pursue the 
target debt-equity ratios during the sampling period.  However, the evidence seems 
to be stronger when developing the panel dataset to test since 4 out of 6 ratios moved 
toward the industry mean with statistically significant. Furthermore, the mean b 
coefficient of the sample firms converge their leverage ratios at the different rate for 
each ratio test. Many researchers reveal that the target debt ratios depend on well 
accepted firm characteristics. Adopting these theories, firms that are under- or over-
leveraged by this measure try to adjust their debt ratios to offset the observed gap. It 
appears that the targeting behavior is evident in both market-valued and book-valued 
leverage measures (Brailsford et al, 2002). 
 
6.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
To explain why the result in this study illustrates some conflicting evidence with 
theoretical expectations, the research limitation has been discussed. To take an 
example, the number of sample size may not truly reflect the whole picture of capital 
structure in pharmaceutical companies. Give me more time; I would attempt to cover 
all pharmaceutical companies in all Stock Exchanges operating over the world to run 
the regression analysis. A study on the lager number of sample size could help this 
GLVVHUWDWLRQJDLQDQRYHUYLHZSLFWXUHRISKDUPDFHXWLFDOFRPSDQLHV¶FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH 
 
Next, this dissertation apply the partial adjustment model introduced by Lev (1969) 
to test the convergence of the leverage ratios to the target ratios, which in this case 
the industry mean is assumed as the target for the industry. However, the different 
definitions of the target capital structure may lead to the different explanation for the 
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results or alternative studies. However, there are several methods to test the theory in 
pursuing of the target ratios as briefly described in the literature review. For instance, 
the model by Wu and Ho (1997) is different from partial adjustment model by Lev 
(1969) in that the long-run steady state (equilibrium) condition is embedded in the 
short-run ratio dynamics. This model guides the study to separate the movement of 
financial ratios into two components including passive industry wide effects and 
active adjustment by management. In order to describing financial ratio behaviour, 
the designed ratio model seems to be a more suitable framework than the simple 
partial adjustment model. Thus, this model may improve the results of the regression 
analysis. 
 
Moreover, due to the limitations in this study, it is interesting to investigate whether 
the capital structure of pharmaceutical companies listed in the SEC have any 
different structure compared to companies in stock market of other countries. The 
further research can be investigated on the attempt of deploying the same 
methodology with other countries in order to compare the analysis results which may 
help to explore different aspects. 
 
Finally, this study tries to reveal two major omissions from the previous empirical 
studies. First, from the empirical results in Chapter 4, although the target ratio may 
not be reached instantly, an adjustment mechanism should be applied. This 
mechanism must be included within any capital structure model. However, it seems 
that this issue has scarcely been tackled by other empirical literature. Second, to 
XQGHUVWDQGILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHGHFLVLRQVLWLV important to study WKHILUP¶VSRLQW
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of view in the aspect of changes in financing behavior. The above omissions should 
be drawn to further attentions. 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
The study performed in this dissertation focuses upon the main issues in the pursuit 
of target capital structure of pharmaceutical companies listed in the SEC. This report 
seeks to answer the questions raised in Chapter 1 by using leverage proportions 
regarding the debt-equity ratios. It also implies that there is an extent to which these 
ratios are expected to be adjusted to the industry mean. Again such a conclusion, 
drawn from the presented evidence is tentative. Moreover, further empirical 
investigation is also needed to substantiate. Despite all the limitations of this study, 
this finding has some valuable implications for firms to consider their financing 
decisions and to provide practical guidelines to financial managers. The predictive 
model from regression analysis could be adopted by investment analysts to forecast 
the financial policy of particular companies. Furthermore, financial managers 
looking to raise capitals might utilise the model to obtain an insight into the decision 
other managers would make under the same circumstances. All of these may 
generate awareness for management to consider the target capital structure in the 
closer future or realise the impact of the financial issues on WKH FRPSDQ\¶V GHEW-
equity level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Industry Means by Financial Ratios 
 
Year LTD/TA TD/TA STD/TE LTD/TE TD/TE TE/TA 
1998 14.11% 18.81% 10.18% 54.35% 64.52% 55.99% 
1999 15.54% 20.92% 11.73% 43.40% 55.13% 53.81% 
2000 11.92% 15.84% 7.97% 23.66% 31.64% 58.42% 
2001 17.42% 20.93% 7.67% 42.59% 50.26% 56.67% 
2002 21.72% 25.58% 8.62% 52.15% 60.77% 52.35% 
2003 18.98% 20.55% 3.12% 46.75% 49.88% 55.34% 
2004 15.38% 18.97% 7.26% 37.76% 45.02% 57.28% 
2005 13.63% 20.68% 19.39% 33.88% 53.27% 55.49% 
2006 17.67% 23.21% 12.15% 39.05% 51.20% 52.19% 
2007 16.52% 21.63% 11.91% 36.27% 48.19% 52.12% 
2008 18.38% 24.75% 16.13% 44.96% 61.09% 49.14% 
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Appendix B:  Regression Results  
    
 
       
 
Long-term debt-to-total assets ratios 
    
        
 
        
 
  
        Durbin-   Std Error 
 
 Company  
Coefficient 
Alpha 
Coefficient 
Beta 
Watson 
Stat R-squred  R-squred  
1 0.012   0.337   2.465 0.081 0.16258 
 
 t-Statistic  0.212   0.842   
 
    
 
2 -0.113   0.286   1.875 0.087 0.1255 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.628   0.872   
 
    
 
3 0.016   0.211   2.058 0.091 0.19914 
 
 t-Statistic  0.191   0.894   
 
    
 
4 0.079   0.528   1.646 0.28 0.09566 
 
 t-Statistic  1.279   1.763   
 
    
 
5 0.035   0.481   2.368 0.211 0.08593 
 
 t-Statistic  0.918   1.461   
 
    
 
6 0.059   0.33   2.23 0.174 0.17021 
 
 t-Statistic  1.061   1.298   
 
    
 
7 -0.279   0.649   1.271 0.32 0.17368 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.651   1.941 * 
 
    
 
8 -0.304   0.4   1.02 0.245 0.2313 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.601   1.609   
 
    
 
9 0.045   0.146   1.922 0.042 0.54237 
 
 t-Statistic  0.196   0.592   
 
    
 
10 -0.233   0.559   1.267 0.261 0.72233 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.779   1.679   
 
    
 
11 -0.214   0.009   1.602 0 0.71961 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.936   0.032   
 
    
 
12 -0.055   0.625   2.694 0.463 0.27699 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.556   2.277 * 
 
    
 
13 -0.153   0.973   1.803 0.522 1.17751 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.391   2.955   
 
    
 
14 0.048   0.537   2.316 0.316 0.12842 
 
 t-Statistic  1.091   1.924 * 
 
  
  
 
15 0.041   1.387   1.994 0.635 0.35283 
 
 t-Statistic  0.365   3.733 ***       
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Total debt-to-total assets ratios 
    
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
  
        Durbin-   Std Error 
 
 Company  
Coefficient 
Alpha 
Coefficient 
Beta 
Watson 
Stat R-squred  R-squred  
1 0.015   1.151   2.279 0.414 0.19294 
 
 t-Statistic  0.239   2.375 ** 
 
    
 
2 -0.06   0.485   2.282 0.191 0.1972 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.818   1.375   
 
    
 
3 0.002   0.252   2.48 0.121 0.18131 
 
 t-Statistic  0.03   1.05   
 
    
 
4 0.027   0.325   1.632 0.205   
 
 t-Statistic  0.727   1.437   
 
    
 
5 0.046   0.803   2.186 0.273 0.11462 
 
 t-Statistic  1.23   1.733   
 
    
 
6 0.031   0.261   1.924 0.117 0.15303 
 
 t-Statistic  0.642   1.028   
 
    
 
7 -0.178   0.495   1.418 0.321 0.14065 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.783   1.947 * 
 
    
 
8 -0.074   0.227   2.189 0.08 0.09307 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.075   0.837   
 
    
 
9 0.007   0.161   1.814 0.046 0.53708 
 
 t-Statistic  0.028   0.619   
 
    
 
10 -0.242   0.617   1.478 0.312 0.61265 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.962   1.904 * 
 
    
 
11 0.127   0.362   1.638 0.229 0.14918 
 
 t-Statistic  1.585   1.543   
 
    
 
12 -0.11   0.617   2.438 0.456 0.26057 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.258   2.588 ** 
 
    
 
13 -0.229   0.992   1.82 0.531 1.06856 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.632   3.008 ** 
 
    
 
14 0.006   0.735   1.981 0.452 0.10016 
 
 t-Statistic  0.193   2.567 ** 
 
    
 
15 0.082   0.958   2.194 0.312 0.13394 
 
 t-Statistic  1.463   1.907 *       
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Short-term debt-to-total equity ratios 
 
    
        
 
  
        Durbin-   Std Error 
 
 Company  
Coefficient 
Alpha 
Coefficient 
Beta 
Watson 
Stat R-squred  R-squred  
1 0.081   1.125 
 
2.864 0.653 0.43726 
 
 t-Statistic  0.566   3.881 **   
 
  
 
2 0.055   0.247 
 
2.599 0.083 0.37119 
 
 t-Statistic  0.363   0.851 
 
  
 
  
 
3 -0.453   0.834 
 
2.537 0.69 0.36081 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.078   2.986 **   
 
  
 
4 -0.048   0.707 
 
2.453 0.208 0.39809 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.379   1.449 
 
  
 
  
 
5 -0.113   0.762 
 
1.952 0.143 0.63187 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.387   1.154 
 
  
 
  
 
6 -0.391   1.114 
 
2.523 0.445 0.62422 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.664   2.53 **   
 
  
 
7 -0.264   0.949 
 
2.021 0.759 0.25778 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.826 ** 5.013 ***   
 
  
 
8 -0.021   0.042 
 
2.446 0.001 0.2255 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.187   0.096 
 
  
 
  
 
9 -1.646   0.963 
 
1.953 0.507 1.4119 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.218 * 2.868 **   
 
  
 
10 -0.495   -0.258 
 
1.356 0.044 0.50276 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.505   -0.215 
 
  
 
  
 
11 0.186   0.751 
 
1.534 0.363 0.74182 
 
 t-Statistic  0.791   2.133 *   
 
  
 
12 -0.891   0.174 
 
2.592 0.062 0.85338 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.498   0.445 
 
  
 
  
 
13 -1.781   0.983 
 
1.588 0.476 0.92154 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.504 ** 2.694 **   
 
  
 
14 -0.582   0.958 
 
2.202 0.482 0.5551 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.647   1.93 
 
  
 
  
 
15 -0.278   0.47 
 
1.761 0.075 0.78353 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.009   0.804         
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Long-term debt-to-total equity ratios 
    
        
 
        
 
  
        Durbin-   Std Error 
 
 Company  Coefficient Alpha Coefficient Beta 
Watson 
Stat R-squred  R-squred  
1 0.02   0.112   2.5 0.01 0.23712 
 
 t-Statistic  0.231   0.28   
 
    
 
2 -0.013   0.076   2.031 0.007 0.15834 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.061   0.241   
 
    
 
3 0.017   0.123   2.034 0.04 0.23143 
 
 t-Statistic  0.137   0.579   
 
    
 
4 0.104   0.484   1.093 0.221 0.16349 
 
 t-Statistic  0.998   1.505   
 
    
 
5 0.045   0.638   2.009 0.252 0.12899 
 
 t-Statistic  1.006   1.64   
 
    
 
6 0.058   0.213   2.242 0.079 0.24308 
 
 t-Statistic  0.748   0.827   
 
    
 
7 -0.315   0.547   1.262 0.261 0.18607 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.466   1.679   
 
    
 
8 -0.398   0.429   1.175 0.245 0.24521 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.64   1.609   
 
    
 
9 0.104   0.099   1.965 0.023 0.64522 
 
 t-Statistic  0.371   0.43   
 
    
 
10 -0.443   0.645   1.208 0.327 0.7584 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.218   1.973 * 
 
    
 
11 -0.205   0.034   1.38 0.002 0.79181 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.816   0.114   
 
    
 
12 -0.18   0.701   2.594 0.527 0.42891 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.18   2.584 ** 
 
    
 
13 -0.291   0.909   1.818 0.51 1.24848 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.673   2.884 ** 
 
    
 
14 -0.029   0.39   2.379 0.207 0.19943 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.393   1.445   
 
    
 
15 -0.072   1.2   1.945 0.547 0.40033 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.552   3.11 **       
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Total debt-to-total equity ratios 
    
 
       
 
 
       
 
  
        Durbin-   Std Error 
 
 Company  
Coefficient 
Alpha 
Coefficient 
Beta 
Watson 
Stat R-squred  R-squred  
1 -0.031   0.847   2.068 0.25 0.28298 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.341   1.633   
 
    
 
2 -0.114   0.506   2.273 0.199 0.24342 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.059   1.411   
 
    
 
3 -0.02   0.2   2.362 0.097 0.21793 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.161   0.926   
 
    
 
4 0.063   0.39   1.472 0.195 0.15813 
 
 t-Statistic  0.763   1.392   
 
    
 
5 0.044   0.972   1.764 0.201 0.21551 
 
 t-Statistic  0.646   1.417   
 
    
 
6 0.04   0.211   2.069 0.073 0.22743 
 
 t-Statistic  0.549   0.792   
 
    
 
7 -0.301   0.599   1.138 0.379 0.16458 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.084 * 2.212 * 
 
    
 
8 -0.3   0.715   2.254 0.323 0.15053 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.039 * 1.954 * 
 
    
 
9 0.078   0.104   1.88 0.022 0.64526 
 
 t-Statistic  0.263   0.422   
 
    
 
10 -0.453   0.706   1.421 0.374 0.6693 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.418   2.186 * 
 
    
 
11 0.137   0.345   2.139 0.176 0.3095 
 
 t-Statistic  1.103   1.307   
 
    
 
12 -0.241   0.703   2.419 0.512 0.39483 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.782   2.898 ** 
 
    
 
13 -0.36   0.928   1.822 0.517 1.13911 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.889   2.926 ** 
 
    
 
14 -0.086   0.546   2.093 0.333 0.1733 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.127   2 * 
 
    
 
15 0.003   0.494   2.081 0.159 0.15271 
 
 t-Statistic  0.063   1.23         
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Total equity-to-total assets ratios 
    
 
       
 
 
       
 
  
        Durbin-   Std Error 
 
 Company  
Coefficient 
Alpha 
Coefficient 
Beta 
Watson 
Stat R-squred  R-squred  
1 -0.076   0.997   2.173 0.366 0.06504 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.893 * 2.148 * 
 
    
 
2 -0.008   0.315   2.344 0.149 0.05027 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.448   1.185   
 
    
 
3 0.004   0.114   1.729 0.021 0.04372 
 
 t-Statistic  0.144   0.41   
 
    
 
4 -0.085   0.422   1.785 0.227 0.08696 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.2   1.532   
 
    
 
5 -0.146   1.228   1.727 0.353 0.09843 
 
 t-Statistic  -2.123 * 2.088 * 
 
    
 
6 -0.072   0.495   2.107 0.226 0.06915 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.472   1.53   
 
    
 
7 0.02   1.103   1.691 0.619 0.02522 
 
 t-Statistic  1.996 * 3.606 *** 
 
    
 
8 0.027   0.851   1.537 0.397 0.08695 
 
 t-Statistic  0.94   2.293 * 
 
    
 
9 -0.057   -0.05   2.247 0.007 0.10812 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.498   -0.242   
 
    
 
10 0.18   1.594   1.539 0.76 0.0675 
 
 t-Statistic  4.15 *** 5.036 *** 
 
    
 
11 -0.098   0.624   2.213 0.333 0.15287 
 
 t-Statistic  -1.498   1.998 * 
 
    
 
12 0.038   0.56   2.439 0.506 0.15649 
 
 t-Statistic  0.77   2.86 ** 
 
    
 
13 0.034   0.901   1.898 0.462 0.10599 
 
 t-Statistic  0.879   2.623 ** 
 
    
 
14 0.039   0.834   1.782 0.435 0.06041 
 
 t-Statistic  1.443   2.483 ** 
 
    
 
15 -0.003   0.178   1.361 0.059 0.04235 
 
 t-Statistic  -0.142   0.706         
 
 
